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Abstract
This paper investigates the manufacture’s production and 
pricing strategies with carbon tax policy and strategic 
customer behavior, and analyze the impact of carbon 
tax policy and its parameter on the manufacturer’s 
optimal strategies and maximum expected profit. We 
derive the optimal production, pricing strategies and 
maximum expected profit under the rational expectations 
equilibrium. The results show that the manufacturer’s 
optimal production quantity and maximum expected profit 
are decreasing in carbon tax rate, and the manufacturer’s 
optimal price is increasing in the carbon tax rate. 
Compared with the no carbon emission policy scenario, 
we prove that the manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity decreases, the manufacturer’s optimal price 
increases, the manufacturer’s maximum expected profit 
decreases, and the carbon tax policy effectively reduces 
the manufacturer’s carbon emissions.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change and global warming are a serious threat 
to human survival and development. Excessive carbon 
dioxide emissions are considered as the main cause of 
global warming (Song & Leng, 2012). For environmental 
protection, governments around the world are required 
to implement carbon emission policy to reduce carbon 
emissions. Considered to be cost-effective emission 
reduction policy, carbon tax has accepted and adopted by 
many countries, such as Italy, Finland and the Netherlands 
and so on (Baranzini, Goldemberg, & Speck, 2000). In this 
context, the impact of the implementation of Carbon tax 
policy on enterprise operational decisions is concerned by 
the majority of scholars. Song and Leng (2012) examined 
the classical single-cycle problem with carbon tax policy, 
derived the optimal production quantity and maximum 
expected profit and draw the corresponding managerial 
implications. They show that, in order to reduce carbon 
emissions by a certain percentage, the tax rate imposed 
on the high-margin firm should be less than that on the 
low-margin firm for the high-profit perishable products, 
whereas the high-margin firm should absorb a high tax 
than the low-margin firm for the low-profit products. Choi 
(2013a)  analytically studies how a properly designed 
carbon footprint taxation scheme can be imposed on a 
quick response (QR) system that enhance environmental 
sustainability via employing a local manufacturer to 
offset the probable higher total logistics and production 
costs. By examining both the single-ordering and the 
dual-QR ordering systems, it illustrates how the carbon 
footprint taxation scheme affects the optimal choice of 
the sourcing decision. Choi (2013b) studies an optimal 
supplier selection problem in the fashion apparel supply 
chain in the presence of carbon emission tax and analyzes 
the impact of linear and quadratic carbon emission tax 
scheme on supplier selection strategies. Shi et al.  (2013) 
analyze the emission reduction effect, economic effect and 
emission reduction cost of single carbon tax policy, single 
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cap and trade, and mixed carbon tax and cap and trade 
policy. All the studies above laid the foundation for our 
research, but they did not consider strategic customer 
behavior. In fact, strategic customer behavior has 
become a common phenomenon in perishable products 
sale process (Su & Zhang, 2008). Strategic customer 
behavior refers to that customers anticipate future sales 
and choose purchase timing to maximize their expected 
surplus. Many scholars have studied the impact of 
strategic customer behavior on corporate operational 
decisions. Su and Zhang (2009) studies the impact of 
strategic customer behavior on supply chain performance 
and derive the optimal price,  the optimal order 
quantity and the maximum expected profit of rational 
expectations equilibrium. Levin et al. (2010) formulate 
a dynamic pricing model for a monopolistic company 
selling a perishable product to a finite population of 
strategic consumers. They prove the existence of a 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium pricing policy 
and provide equilibrium optimality conditions for both 
customer and seller. Yang (2012) investigates the impact 
of discounting and retailer competition on decentralized 
channel performance with strategic customers. They 
show that a decentralized channel may have higher 
profit than that of a centralized channel with strategic 
customers. Huang et al. (2011) examine the multi-
product newsvendor problem with the budget constraint 
and strategic customers. They obtain the rational 
expectation equilibrium solution to the static game 
between the newsvendor and the strategic customers 
and analyze the impact of quantity commitment on the 
equilibrium quantity and equilibrium price. Jiang and 
Chen (2012) investigate the manufacturer’s production 
and pricing policy with both cap policy and strategic 
customer behavior. They derive the manufacturer’s 
optimal production and pricing policy. Researches above 
in-depth analyzed the impact of strategic customer 
behavior on business operations decisions, but they did 
not combine with the carbon tax policy.
The paper integrates the carbon tax policy and 
strategic customer behavior into a model to examine 
the manufacturer’s operational decisions. The paper 
address three issues: (a) what is the manufacturer’s 
optimal decisions; (b) How does the carbon tax policy 
and its parameter impact on the manufacturer’s optimal 
decisions, the maximum expected profit and the carbon 
emissions; (c) the impact of strategic customer behavior 
on the manufacturer’s optimal decisions and the maximum 
expected profit.
1 .   M O D E L  D E S C R I P T I O N S  A N D 
ASSUMPTION
We consider monopoly manufacturer facing homogeneous 
strategic customers decide the production quantity and 
price simultaneously with carbon tax policy. We divide the 
whole sales period into two phases i.e. phase I and II. The 
manufacturer sells the products to customers at full price 
in phase I and sells the leftover products to the customers 
at salvage price in phase II.In order to maximum the 
expected surplus, customers decide purchase immediate 
or waiting the price markdown. We don’t consider the 
shortage costs.
We denote our parameters and variables for model 
development as the following notations in Table 1.
Table 1 
Parameters and Variables
Notation Descriptions
D The random demand of customer, D≥0.
F(x) Distribution function of random demand D. Denote F
_
=1-F.
f(x) Probability density function of random demand D.we assume that f(x) is continuous and the demand distribution has an increasing failure rate i.e. f(x)/1-F(x)increasing in x.
c Unit produce cost of the product.
p Unit retail selling price of the product, which is observed by the customers.
q Produce quantities for the product, which is customers’ private information and cannot be observed by the customers.
s Unit salvage price of the product.
v The value of unit product to the customer i.e. the customers’ utility from consuming the product.
r Customers’ reservation price, which is customers’ private information and cannot be observed by the manufacturer.
ξr The beliefs of the manufacturer over the customer’ reservation price.
ξprob The beliefs of customers over their chances of obtaining the product on the salvage market.
τ Tax rate of carbon tax policy i.e. the cost per unit carbon emission.
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The parameters must satisfy certain conditions for the 
model to make “sense”, so we assume:
(a) p≤r. Only when the retail selling price not more 
than the customer reservation price, the customer may 
purchase the product at full price.
(b) v>p>c>s>0. This condition states that there is a 
positive profit margin for the manufacturer and customers 
when a product is sold to customers. In addition, the 
production cost is greater than the salvage price, which 
indicates that the manufacturer will lose money when 
the product failed to sell at full price. This prompted the 
manufacturer to arrange the production plan according to 
the customers’ demand, because the excess inventories 
generate losses.
(c) τ<v-c. It shows that the manufacturer is profitable 
from production. Otherwise, the manufacturer will be out 
of the market without production.
The sequence of events is as follows: First, the 
manufacturer forms the belief of customers’ reservation 
price ξr and then decides the retail selling price, product 
quantity and carbon trading volume; second, the customers 
form the beliefs ξprob of probability of the product selling at salvage price s according to the information of market 
price and then form the reservation price r; third, the 
customers’ demand is satisfied and the products are sold at 
full price p; finally, all remaining products are sold to the 
external market at salvage price s.
2.  THE MANUFACTURER’S OPTIMAL 
STRATEGY
In this paper, the rational expectations equilibrium 
problem between the manufacturer and the customers is 
examined with rational expectations equilibrium method. 
Rational expectations hypothesis first proposed by Muth 
(1961) and then introduced into operations management 
by Su and Zhang (2008) to analyze the enterprises’ 
decision problems in the presence of strategic customer 
behavior. Rational expectations equilibrium refers to there 
is no systematic bias between the result of economics and 
the people’s expectation.
First, we examine the decision-making behavior of 
strategic customers. The customers choose purchase 
immediately at full price or wait for markdown to 
maximize their expected surplus. The consumer’s expected 
surplus is v-p((v-s)ξprob) when the customer purchases the 
product at full price (salvage price). Then we can obtain 
the customer’s expected surplus max{v-p,(v-s)ξprob}. If and 
only if v-p≥(v-s)ξprob, the customer will buy at full price. So 
given ξprob, we can obtain the customer’s reservation price 
r(ξprob)=v-(v-s)ξprob.
Second, we examine the manufacturer’s decision 
problem. The manufacturer decides the production 
quantity q and full price p to maximize his expected profit. 
When D>q, the manufacturer’s profit is (p-c-τ)q. When 
D≤q, the manufacturer’s profit is pD+s(q-D)-(c+τ)q. By 
rearranging we obtain the manufacturer’s expected profit 
function with carbon tax:
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The beliefs of the manufacturer over the customer’ 
reservation price is ξr. Obviously, the manufacturer will set 
p=ξr and q(p)=arg maxqΠt(q, p). According to the definition 
of rational expectations equilibrium in Su and Zhang 
(2008), the solution of rational expectations equilibrium 
(p,q,r,ξr,ξprob) must meet the following conditions:
    r=v-(v-s)ξprob  ,  (2)
   p=ξr , (3)
  q=arg maxqΠt(q, p)  , (4)
     ξprob=F(q   , (5)
   ξr=r  . (6)
Conditions (2) (3), and (4) indicate, and indicate that 
the manufacturer and customers will choose the action 
to maximize their own utility. Conditions (5) and (6) can 
ensure the solution meets rational expectations hypothesis 
i.e. the actual situation of economic in line with people’s 
expectations.
The rational expectations equilibrium makes:
    p=v-(v-s)F(q) . (7)
As to the manufacturer’s optimal production and 
pricing strategies with carbon tax policy, we get the 
following proposition.
Proposition 1 the manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity and optimal price with carbon tax policy exist 
and are unique. The manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity (q*) is:
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The manufacturer’s optimal price (p*) is:
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P r o o f :  F r o m  ( 1 ) ,  w e  c a n 
obtain
 
0
(( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ))t
q
F x dxq p p s E q c s qτΠ = − − − + −∫
 * 1( )c sq F
v s
τ− + −=
−
 * ( )( )p s c s v sτ= + + − −
 2
2
( , )
( ) ( ) 0t
d q p
p s f q
dq
Π
= − − <
 ( , ) 0td q p
dq
Π
=
 * 1( )c sq F
v s
τ− + −=
−
 * ( )( )p s c s v sτ= + + − −
 ** * * * *
0
( , ) ( ) ( ()( ) )
q
t Fq p p s q c s qx dx τΠ = − − − + −∫
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can prove the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity 
and optimal price exist and are unique.
Set
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_
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with (7), we can obtain equations with respect to p and 
q .  Solve the equations, we have
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. This completes the proof.
This proposition means that the manufacturer’s 
optimal production quantity and optimal price with 
strategic customer behavior and carbon tax policy exist 
and are unique.
(8),  (9) are substituted in the manufacturer ’s 
p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n ,  w e  g e t  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ’s 
m a x i m u m  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  w i t h  s t r a t e g i c 
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customer behavior and carbon tax policy. That is 
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3.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In order to understand the impact of carbon tax policy 
parameter i.e. τ on the manufacturer’s optimal strategies 
and the maximum expected profit, we analyze the changes 
in q*, p* and Πt(q
*, p*) on τ.
By analyzing changes in q* and p* on τ, we get the 
following proposition:
Proposition 2 q* is decreasing in τ, p* is increasing in τ.
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Then we can obtain that q* is decreasing in τ, p* is 
increasing in τ. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 shows that the manufacturer’s optimal 
production quantity and optimal price are affected by 
the carbon tax set by the government. As the carbon 
tax increases, the manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity decreases and optimal price increases. When 
the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity equals to 
q*, the manufacturer’s margin profit under the Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium (production decision and 
pricing decision satisfy (7)) is 
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microeconomics, the manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity follows the condition that the margin profit equal 
to zero. The conclusion of this paper is consistent with the 
above rule.
When the government charges a higher carbon tax, 
it makes a higher marginal production quantity cost 
of manufacturers. To make the  margin profit equal to 
zero, manufacturers must continue to reduce production 
quantity, by improving the buying willingness at the 
full price the customer to make the price  continuous 
increase.
By analyzing changes in τ on Πt(q
*, p*), we get the 
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Πt(q*, p*) is decreasing inτ.
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manufacturer’s maximum expected profit function, we 
get
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According to Envelope Theorem, we get:
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we obtain that Πt(q
*, p*) is decreasing in carbon tax rate.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 3 indicates that the manufacturer’s 
maximum expected profit decreases with the increasing 
of carbon tax rate. Carbon tax rate increases the 
manufacturer’s production costs, in order to avoid the loss 
of profit, the manufacturer has to reduce the production 
quantity and increase the sales price. However, among 
the factors that affect profit, cost rising lead to the loss 
of profit is dominated. As a result, when the carbon 
tax rate increases, the production cost continuously 
rises, and the manufacturer’s maximum expected profit 
decreases.
4.   THE IMPACT OF CARBON TAX 
POLICY ANALYSIS
In this part, comparing with the scenario without carbon 
policy, we analyze the impact of carbon tax policy on 
manufacturer’s optimal production quantity, price and 
maximum expected profit. When τ=0, that is the scenario 
without carbon policy. Put τ=0 into q*, p*and Πt(q, p), we 
get manufacturer’s optimal production quantity (qn), price 
34Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
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(pn) and maximum expected profit (Πn(qn, pn)) without 
carbon policy.
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Compare the manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity and price with carbon tax policy and without 
carbon policy, we obtain the propositions as follows.
Proposition 4 q*<qn; p*>pn.
Proof: As
 1( )n
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−
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, we get 
q*<qn. According to formula (7), p is decreasing in q, and 
as q*<qn , we get p
*>pn.This completes the proof.
Proposition 4  shows that compared with the 
scenario without carbon policy, the manufacturer’s 
optimal production quantity decreased but the optimal 
price increased under carbon tax policy. The lower the 
manufacturer’s production quantity is, the lower the 
probability of customers buying the products in phase 
II is, and the higher the customer’s reservation optimal 
price is. Manufacturers would make the price equals to 
customer’s reservation price, so manufacturer’s production 
quantity decreases, the product price increases, and the 
manufacturer’s marginal revenue increases. Under the 
carbon tax policy, the manufacturer’s marginal produce 
cost increase. If keeps the original production quantity 
level, the manufacturer’s marginal cost is greater than 
marginal revenue. To maximize the profit, the manufacturer 
has to reduce the production quantity, improve customer’s 
buying willingness, so as to improve product price and 
marginal revenue, and makes the marginal revenue equal 
to the marginal cost of production.
Comparing with the scenario of no carbon emission 
policy, the the manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity decreases under carbon tax policy. According to 
the hypothesis of this paper, that is producing every unit 
of the product would produce a unit of carbon emission. 
It shows that manufacturer’s optimal carbon emission 
under carbon tax policy is lower than that of no carbon 
emission policy. Therefore, the implementation of carbon 
tax policy effectively reduces the manufacturer’s carbon 
emissions. The degree of carbon emissions reduction is 
positive correlation with the carbon tax rate (because the 
manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is negative 
correlation with the carbon tax rate), that is, the higher 
the carbon tax rate is, and the effect of carbon tax policy 
is more obvious.
Comparing the manufacturer’s maximum expected 
profit under carbon tax policy and no carbon emission 
policy, we obtain the following propositions:
Proposition 5 Πt(q*, p*)<Πn(qn, pn)
Proof: when τ=0，that is the scenario under no carbon 
policy, Πt(q
*, p*)=Πn(qn, pn). According to proposition 3, 
we know that Πt(q
*, p*) is decreasing in τ，that is, when 
τ>0, Πt(q
*, p*)<Πn(qn, pn).This completes the proof.
Proposition 5 shows that manufacturer’s maximum 
expected profit under Carbon tax policy is less than that 
under no carbon policy. When government charges the 
carbon tax, it could strictly reduce the manufacturer’s 
maximum expected profit. Compared with the scenario 
of no carbon policy, Carbon tax policy increases the 
manufacturer’s  produce cost directly. The manufacturer 
can adjust the product production quantity and price to 
offset part of the loss of profit, but he cannot save all. As a 
result, the manufacturer’s maximum expected profit under 
carbon tax policy is less than that under no carbon policy.
5 .   C O N C L U S I O N  A N D  F U T U R E 
RESEARCH
This paper studied how a manufacturer facing the strategic 
customer behavior made the joint production quantity and 
pricing decisions under carbon tax policy, and analyzed 
the impact of carbon tax policy and its parameter on 
manufacturer’s optimal decisions and maximum expected 
profit. First, we obtained manufacturer’s optimal production 
quantity, price and maximum expected profit under carbon 
tax policy and strategic customer behavior; Secondly, we 
found that manufacturer’s optimal production quantity 
is decreasing in carbon tax rate, manufacturer’s optimal 
price is increasing in carbon tax rate, and manufacturer’s 
maximum expected profit is decreasing in carbon tax rate; 
Finally, compared with the scenario of no carbon policy, we 
found that the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity 
is decreasing, optimal price is increasing and maximum 
expected profit was decreasing under carbon tax policy. 
This paper studied the operating decision problem 
from the perspective of manufacturer under carbon tax 
policy and strategic customer behavior. However, in real 
society, the supply chain environment is more common, so 
studying from the perspective of the supply chain will be 
more valuable. If considering manufacturer’s production 
quantity decisions and retailer’s pricing decisions, we 
can expand our research from a single manufacturer to a 
supply chain environment. Therefore, the further research 
direction of this paper is corporate operational decision-
making problem from the perspective of the supply chain 
under carbon tax policies and strategic customer behavior.
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